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InTRoDuCTIon
the current financial crisis appeared in the form of banking 
crisis  in  most  of  the  countries  affected.  in  addition  to 
bankruptcies,  several  banks  which  ran  into  trouble  were 
recapitalised  or  nationalised,  just  to  mention  the  most 
spectacular elements. As a banking crisis entails severe real 
economic effects, its avoidance or proper management is an 
important economic policy task. this also contributed to 
the strengthening of financial stability aspects in monetary 
policy decision-making both in Hungary and a number of 
other countries.
On this occasion, the financial crisis started in the developed 
countries, mainly in the united States, and the next victim 
– owing to its high exposure to the uS mortgage market – 
was the banking sector of the developed european countries, 
where concerns about high sovereign debts have also come 
to the fore now.
As  the  Hungarian  economy  and  banking  sector  also 
constitute an integral part of the european economic and 
financial system, which has been hard-hit by the banking 
crises,  Hungary  is  also  seriously  affected  by  the 
macroeconomic effects. in parallel with the international 
developments, after October 2008 the liquidity situation in 
the Hungarian financial system deteriorated severely, and 
the  foreign  exchange,  equity  and  government  securities 
markets also came under significant pressure. the evolving 
liquidity and balance of payments crisis was overcome with 
the help of the international financial package as well as the 
measures of the magyar nemzeti bank and the government. 
the crisis threatening the capital position of foreign parent 
banks did not pass through to their subsidiaries in Hungary. 
However, the fiscal policy room for manoeuvre, which is 
limited  owing  to  the  high  public  debt,  and  the  real 
economy,  which  is  contracting  more  strongly  than  the 
european average, add to the risks related to the banking 
sector.
taking  account  of  Hungary’s  exposure  to  international 
crisis developments, it is worth reviewing how the banking 
crises observed in past decades took place. Of course, many 
important features of the current crisis are different from 
the  earlier  cases,  which  warrants  a  cautious  handling  of 
conclusions.  However,  we  still  believe  that  it  is  worth 
summarising  what  dangers  have  been  highlighted  by  the 
experiences of past systemic bank crises.
For the identification of banking crises, we took the banking 
crisis definition of the international monetary Fund (imF) 
as  a  basis,  according  to  which  those  episodes  are  called 
systemic banking crisis2 when the number of bankruptcies 
increases significantly in the corporate and financial sectors 
of  a  country,  and/or  companies  have  serious  difficulties 
settling their debts on time. At times like these the ratio of 
non-performing  loans  usually  increases  considerably,  and 
the capital of the banking sector declines. in many cases 
these developments are accompanied by a fall in asset prices 
(equities and real estate in particular), a drastic increase in 
the real interest rate and a sudden stop or reversal of capital 
inflows. As can be seen from the very general wording of the 
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definition, the identification of crisis episodes also allows 
subjective deliberation to some extent.
the episodes examined by us originate from the international 
database of laeven–Valencia (2008), compiled in the spirit 
of the above definition. the authors presented 42 cases in 
detail; of these, we selected the crises of the economies with 
a higher level of development that are better integrated in 
the world economy, ignoring the still ongoing crises. We 
complemented  the  resulting  30-element  sample  with 
macroeconomic data from the financial database of the imF 
(international Financial Statistics, iFS).
We  paid  special  attention  to  characteristics,  which  we 
believe to deepen banking crises. in our opinion, one of 
these aggravating circumstances is if the banking crisis is 
coupled  with  a  currency  crisis3  or  if  the  fiscal  means 
available  for  its  management  are  limited,  for  example 
because  of  debt  accumulated  earlier.  the  latter  category 
includes those episodes where, prior to the crisis, the level 
of public debt exceeded fifty per cent of GDP, which is a 
higher-than-average threshold value. in addition, we strived 
to obtain further, less quantified information from the case 
studies  about  individual  episodes,  for  example  about 
measures  taken  by  the  authorities  and  the  magnitude  of 
currency  mismatch  of  economic  agents.4  it  is  worth 
mentioning that the latter two of the examined factors are 
typical  of  the  Hungarian  economy  as  well,  and  that  the 
exchange  rate  of  the  forint  also  underwent  a  significant 
depreciation in the first quarter of 2009, even if no currency 
crisis in line with the definition of the imF was experienced.
On the basis of these data, first we examine what measures 
are characteristic of a ‘typical’ banking crisis. Within that, 
we concentrate in particular on the first period, which can 
be  characterised  with  the  liquidity  crisis,  during  which 
monetary  policy  may  play  a  greater  role,  allowing  the 
drawing of more interesting conclusions from a central bank 
aspect. then we examine how the various macroeconomic 
and  financial  variables  behaved  in  the  environment  of 
banking  crises  over  several  years.  Although  the  average 
developments  in  various  variables  cover  heterogeneous 
countries,  the  fundamental  trends  can  be  seen  from  the 
average behaviour as well. As a result of the time span, at the 
same time this also provides an outlook on the period after 
the liquidity crisis, which is characterised by the restructuring 
of the banking sector and the increased role of fiscal policy.
LIQuIDITy CRISIS mAnAGEmEnT
the period of a banking crisis can usually be broken down 
into two broad phases: the aim in the first phase is to solve 
liquidity  problems  and  to  prevent  the  tensions  of  the 
banking sector from passing through to real economy, while 
in the second phase the restoration of the ability to function 
and the solvency of the banking sector comes to the fore. 
these two phases cannot perfectly be separated in time; 
liquidity  troubles  may  return  from  time  to  time  during 
protracted banking crises.
liquidity problems may be triggered by a loss of confidence 
among domestic depositors or foreign lenders. While in the 
former case domestic foreign exchange liquidity becomes 
tight, and bank run may occur, in the latter case the scarcity 
of foreign currencies is typical, which is accompanied by 
capital outflows in many cases.
Central  banks  can  remedy  liquidity  shortages  in  foreign 
exchange to the extent of the foreign exchange reserves by 
providing  foreign  exchange  liquidity  or  by  FX  swap5 
agreements with foreign central banks, and the government 
can  borrow  from  international  organisations.  Additional 
help may be if foreign banks operate subsidiary banks in the 
given  country  and  the  parent  banks  themselves  provide 
foreign exchange liquidity to their subsidiaries.
the  scarcity  of  domestic  currency  can  be  treated  with 
liquidity  support,  lowering  of  the  reserve  requirements, 
deposit guarantees or, in more serious cases, with ordering 
a  bank  holiday  or  possibly  by  freezing  deposits.  the 
frequency  of  using  these  means  is  very  different:  while 
targeted liquidity support proved to be very widespread in 
the sample examined, lowering of the reserve requirements, 
which  affects  all  banks  equally,  was  used  somewhat  less 
often  (Chart  1).  undertaking  and  extending  deposit 
guarantees  is  also  among  the  relatively  more  frequently 
applied tools; it is common mostly in those countries where 
there is no functioning deposit insurance system when the 
crisis begins. in these cases, a credible blanket guarantee 
ordered in time may be able to prevent the evolution of a 
bank  panic.  in  view  of  their  drastic  character,  freezing 
deposits  and  ordering  a  bank  holiday  are  much  less 
frequently  applied  tools;  moreover,  they  are  unable  to 
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the  frequency  of  using  individual  tools  can  change 
significantly depending on the circumstances of the banking 
crisis as well, because then the efficiency of the tools and the 
risk of their use may change. in the case of currency crises 
and  considerable  unhedged  exchange  rate  risks  (currency 
mismatch),  liquidity  support  takes  place  more  often 
compared  to  the  whole  sample,  while  the  reserve 
requirements are lowered less frequently. this is an attempt 
to avoid the danger that the liquidity surplus that evolves at 
certain  participants  as  a  result  of  the  general  liquidity 
expansion will be used for exchange rate speculation. the 
blanket guarantee is also a popular tool, as it also does not 
provide broad opportunities for making profits by weakening 
the exchange rate.
the frequency of using drastic means is relatively high in 
the group of countries with high public debt. Presumably, 
this occurred in those cases when the government was not 
able or willing to finance other, more expensive measures 
any more, or when the introduction of a state guarantee on 
deposits  was  not  sufficiently  credible  due  to  the  high 
indebtedness.
the  management  of  banking  crises  can  be  very  costly. 
According to the imF database, fiscal costs directly related 
to crisis management amount to an average 15 per cent of 
GDP in the year of the crisis and the subsequent five years. 
if the revenues that later return to the budget (for example 
from  the  subsequent  privatisation  of  the  nationalised 
assets) are also taken into account, this value still exceeds 
10  per  cent  of  GDP.  Another  aggravating  circumstance 
according  to  Reinhart–Rogoff  (2008)  is  that  the  costs 
directly  related  to  crisis  management  appear  small  in 
comparison to the fiscal costs of the lost tax revenues and 
surging  social  expenditures  resulting  from  the  recession 
accompanying the banking crisis. therefore, they consider 
the  cumulative  growth  of  public  debt  a  good  indicator, 
which was 83 per cent higher in real terms and on average 
in the sample they examined in the three years following 
the crisis. Financial markets are less willing to tolerate an 
increase of this magnitude in public debt in the case of a 
high initial level.
in  addition  to  the  classical  tools  of  managing  bank 
liquidity crises, Chart 1 also shows the frequency of ex 
post controls on capital outflows. it is also worthy of note 
– and cannot be seen in the chart – that capital controls 
were introduced in the sample processed by us only when 
a  currency  crisis  was  also  evolving  in  parallel  with  the 
banking crisis. therefore, capital control as a tool rather 
serves the purpose of currency crisis management, i.e. it is 
not  the  primary  means  of  solving  the  banking  liquidity 
crisis.
Chart 1
Relative frequency of means most often used by 
authorities in banking crisis management
Sources: Laeven–Valencia (2008) and own data collection.
































































































































As	 a	 result,	 banks	 were	 temporarily	 closed,	 and	 the	 withdrawal	 of	
deposits	 was	 limited	 (corralito).	 The	 financial	 intermediary	 system	







Depositors	 were	 also	 hard-hit	 by	 the	 banking	 crisis	 in	 Indonesia.	
Between	 August	 and	 the	 end	 of	 October	 1997	 the	 exchange	 rate	
weakened	by	40	per	cent	against	the	US	dollar,	leading	to	the	bankruptcy	
of	 16	 small	 banks.	These	 banks	 were	 closed	 down	 on	 1	 November	
without	compensating	their	depositors	in	any	form.	This	triggered	a	
permanent	bank	panic,	wrecking	more	banks,	despite	the	fact	that	at	
Box 1: Application of drastic management tools in banking crisesmAGyAR nemZeti bAnK
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EXCHAnGE RATE AnD InTEREST RATE 
PoLICy
traditional  monetary  policy  instruments  play  a  very 
important role in times of crisis management as well. their 
applicability is limited by the fact that the central banks in 
the countries under review often faced a dilemma related 
to  currency  mismatch.  the  underlying  reason  is  that 
although  the  weakening  exchange  rate  improves  export 
competitiveness, at the same time it adds to the repayment 
burden  of  agents  indebted  in  foreign  exchange  without 
hedging the exchange rate risk. On the other hand, the 
raising base rate in order to protect the exchange rate leads 
to an increase in the domestic interest rate level, which 
affects agents who have borrowed in domestic currency. 
Accordingly,  the  vulnerability  of  the  banking  sector 
increases in both cases.
in the case of currency mismatch and depreciation pressure 
on the domestic currency, managing the liquidity crisis of 
the  banking  sector  may  also  present  a  dilemma  for  the 
monetary  authority.  Direct  liquidity  support  in  domestic 
currency helps to solve the short-term liquidity problem of 
the banking sector, but at the same time pressure on the 
domestic  currency  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  also 
strengthens.  in  some  banking  crises,  central  banks  chose 
extreme  solutions  in  this  situation:  they  preferred  the 
protection  of  the  exchange  rate,  and  did  not  provide 
liquidity at all, or they considered the short-term health of 
the banking sector as paramount, and provided unlimited 
liquidity in domestic currency, allowing the exchange rate 
to depreciate considerably. in the event that a central bank 
provides liquidity in foreign exchange for closing the open 
foreign exchange position of the banking sector, it does not 
generate any additional depreciation pressure.
based on the experiences of the countries examined, neither 
one of the extreme policies is expedient for handling the 
situation.  Substantial  depreciation  may  become  an 
uncontrollable, self-inducing process, and may cause serious 
damages  in  an  economy  with  unhedged  exchange  rate 
positions. the depreciation pressure on the exchange rate 
cannot really be mitigated with an announced devaluation 
within a controlled framework either; the initial depreciation 
of the exchange rate typically exceeds the intended extent. 
Countries  operating  fixed  or  quasi-fixed  exchange  rate 
regimes before the crisis are usually compelled to switch 
over to a floating exchange rate regime in the end.
the  protection  of  the  exchange  rate  at  any  price,  for 
example  with  foreign  exchange  market  interventions  and 
the  withholding  of  liquidity,  cannot  be  ensured  over  the 
long term; it may reduce central bank reserves to a critical 
level and render the banking sector illiquid. therefore, in 
situations like this it is expedient to open all valves in a 
controlled manner, i.e. to provide liquidity to banks and 
allow the domestic currency to weaken to some extent. the 
central  bank  may  try  to  keep  the  ensuing  depreciation 
pressure  within  a  controlled  framework  by  raising  the 
interest  rate.  However,  experiences  suggest  that  it  is  not 
worth overdoing it either: a nominal interest rate that settles 
at an extremely high level (of 25–30 per cent or higher) for 
a long time exacerbates the decline in the real economy.
in  addition  to  avoiding  extremes,  timing  is  also  highly 
important: the same step taken at different times may send 
completely different messages to the markets. Raising the 
interest rate as a response to exchange rate depreciation may 
let the market know that decision-makers have a good grip 
on  the  situation  and  are  able  to  react  professionally  and 
quickly. However, in view of the real economic consequences, 
it is not expedient to keep the interest rate level permanently 
high,  so  the  proper  timing  for  lowering  it  must  also  be 
found. Starting interest rate cuts too early may be followed 
by renewed weakening of the exchange rate, which in turn 
may warrant raising the interest rate again. this kind of 
cyclicism adds to uncertainty, and undermines the credibility 
of the central bank.
this	 time	 the	 ratio	 of	 non-performing	 loans	 was	 still	 relatively	 low	
(Meesook	et	al.,	2001).	It	might	have	been	possible	to	prevent	the	bank	
panic	 with	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 deposit	 guarantee	 announced	








the	 movable	 capital	 had	 already	 left	 the	 country	 by	 then,	 so	 the	





moderate	 (Meesook	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 The	 Malaysian	 case	 subsequently	
overcame	international	organisations’	resistance	against	the	temporary	
controls	 on	 short-term	 capital	 movements;	 in	 2008,	 the	 IMF	 also	
permitted	Iceland	to	take	a	similar	approach.mnb bulletin • june 2010 17
All of this can be illustrated with the sample containing 30 
countries presented above. the months around the eruption 
of  the  crisis  were  usually  characterised  by  a  significant 
increase in the interest rate level on the money market, with 
the interest rate hikes carried out by the central bank to 
protect the exchange rate also contributing to this (Chart 2). 
During the year following the crisis, a decline in the interest 
rate  is  seen,  although  this  temporarily  entailed  higher 
inflation  (Chart  3).  the  temporary  acceleration  in  price 
increases  may  basically  be  attributable  to  the  drastic 
depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate,  and  thus  to  the  pass-
through effect of import prices.
based on the real effective exchange rates or – where the 
effective  exchange  rate  was  not  available  –  on  the  real 
exchange rates against the uS dollar, the first month of the 
crisis was followed by depreciation (Chart 4). As regards the 
magnitude of depreciation, compared to the average of the 
whole sample, high public debt, unhedged foreign exchange 
positions  and  (not  surprisingly)  the  currency  crisis  are 
exacerbating factors. Depreciation proved to be prolonged 
in each case; only partial correction could be observed in 
the following year. Overall and on average, a permanent 
real  exchange  rate  depreciation  of  around  15  per  cent 
ensued.
based  on  the  sample,  the  real  depreciation  materialised 
mainly  through  the  accommodation  of  the  nominal 
exchange rate. Prolonged protection of fixed exchange rate 
regimes  failed,  although  some  countries  (for  example 
Sweden) achieved temporary successes in this field. Despite 
interpreting the abandonment of exchange rate fixing as an 
economic policy failure in many cases, this was exactly what 
paved  the  way  for  the  export-driven  economic  upswing 
which played an important role in the recovery.
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Chart 2
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REAL EConomIC EFFECTS AnD THE 
BAnKInG SECToR
banking crises in the crisis periods analysed resulted in a 
temporary  decline  in  economic  growth.  Real  economic 
performance,  if  measured  by  the  growth  rate  of  GDP, 
apparently recovered quickly from the effects of the crisis. 
Real  GDP  expanded  again  in  the  countries  concerned 
relatively rapidly, as early as the second year following the 
crisis (Chart 5). Strong depreciation of the exchange rate 
played an important role in the upturn in growth, which 
was export-driven in many cases. However, in the current 
global crisis the possibilities for export growth are limited; 
therefore, the recession may be more protracted compared 
to earlier crises.
Another analysis, which was also conducted on the basis of 
the imF database, yielded a similar result: the output of the 
economy reached the pre-crisis level in 2 years the latest in 
half of the cases (Cecchetti et al., 2009). this means that it 
took typically this much time for the economies to recover 
from the damages caused by the banking crisis. However, it 
is worth calling attention to the fact that the very quick 
recovery of the Southeast Asian countries strongly affects 
the average values; the revival of growth was much slower 
in  other  regions.  in  evaluating  the  results,  caution  is 
warranted  because  none  of  the  banking  crises  examined 
took place amidst circumstances of a global financial crisis 
and recession similar to the current ones. Another important 
conclusion  of  the  aforementioned  study  is  that  if  the 
banking  crisis  is  coupled  with  a  currency  crisis,  it  may 
lengthen the economic recovery by one and a half years on 
average.
the conclusions are less optimistic if the macroeconomic 
costs of the  banking crisis are measured by the cumulated 
output  loss  compared  to  the  pre-crisis  trend.7  the 
accumulated output loss during the crisis and the subsequent 
three  years  reaches  25  per  cent  as  an  average  of  all  the 
countries  examined,  while  for  the  subsample  with  the 
unhedged foreign exchange position it reaches as much as 
40 per cent, which is considered significant. the sustained 
increase in unemployment confirms that the social costs of 
the banking crisis appear for a much more protracted period 
of time than what is suggested by the decline in real GDP 
(Chart 6).
Although	 Sweden	 was	 in	 a	 relatively	 favourable	 economic	 situation	
when	it	was	hit	by	the	banking	crisis,	crisis	management	was	hampered	














November.	 The	 krona	 depreciated	 by	 9	 per	 cent	 immediately.	
Nevertheless,	the	initially	applied	quick	and	significant	interest	rate	hike	
can	be	considered	positive	from	a	communication	aspect:	the	central	
bank	 reacted	 firmly,	 which	 indicated	 to	 the	 markets	 that	 it	 was	
committed	to	preventing	exchange	rate	depreciation.	All	this	may	have	
contributed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 uncontrollable	 depreciation	 did	 not	
subsequently	occur.
In	 the	 crisis	 in	Turkey	 in	 2000,	 the	 dilemma	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 the	
exchange	 rate	 –	 and	 thus	 that	 of	 economic	 agents	 exposed	 to	 the	
exchange	rate	position	–	as	well	as	the	maintenance	of	the	domestic	













Box 2: Interest rate and exchange rate policy during banking crises
7		 In	order	to	quantify	the	output	loss,	the	real	GDP	trend	up	until	the	crisis	is	projected	for	the	following	three	years,	and	the	deviations	of	actual	real	GDP	from	this	
trend	are	summed	up.	The	problem	with	this	indicator	may	be	that	crisis	episodes	are	often	preceded	by	an	overheating	economy,	so	due	to	the	performance	of	
pre-crisis	years	the	trend	–	and	thus	deviation	from	the	trend	as	well	–	is	probably	overestimated.mnb bulletin • june 2010 19
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before the crisis, the current account showed a permanent 
deficit in all subsamples, which is in line with the fact that 
the  sample  countries  are  mainly  emerging  ones  highly 
dependent on external sources (Chart 7). in the two years 
following  the  crisis,  the  current  account  turned  into  a 
surplus in all subsamples, which is not surprising, as the 
crisis  was  almost  always  triggered  by  the  blocking  of 
external  financing.  Consequently,  the  current  account 
surplus  is  not  a  ‘success’,  but  rather  a  sign  of  forced 
adjustment (extra savings).
in  the  sample,  the  decline  in  the  net  external  financing 
requirement was accompanied by adjustment in net exports: 
exports grew faster than imports in the years following the 
crisis.  the  increase  in  exports  may  be  attributable  to 
exchange rate weakening, while weak imports reflect the 
effect  of  restrained  consumption  and  lower  investment 
dynamics, in addition to the exchange rate.
in the episodes analysed, total loans to the private sector as 
a proportion of GDP declined for a relatively longer period 
of time following the crisis; in the countries that experienced 
a banking crisis the ratio of total loans sank to a much lower 
level  than  the  one  characterising  the  year  of  the  crisis 
(typically to 70–80 per cent of that of the year of the crisis) 
(Chart  8).  this  underscores  the  probability  that  the 
adjustment of the real economy takes place faster than that 
of financial intermediation, i.e. a more permanent slowdown 
can be expected in the process of financial deepening than 
in real economic activity.
the ratio of bank loans to deposits was high in the sample 
examined. in banks’ financing structure this indicates that 
the role of the money market and external financing was 
significant (Chart 9). if the share of external funds is high 
within the liabilities of the banking sector, banks become 
exposed  to  the  changes  in  international  risk  tolerance. 
Chart 5
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Chart 8
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based on the sample, the increase in the loan-to-deposit 
ratio typically came to a sudden halt in the year of the 
crisis, and declined by around 15–20 percentage points in 
the  next  two  years.  Accordingly,  the  banking  sector 
attempted to lower its dependency on external funds and 
the ensuing vulnerability. Overall, as a result of the crisis, 
permanent  processes  started  in  the  banking  sector, 
meaning a shift to a more conservative financing structure 
and business policy.
ConCLuSIonS
the  effect  of  the  current  global  financial  crisis  was  felt 
through  several  channels  in  Hungary.  the  unfolding 
liquidity  crisis  was  successfully  contained  by  using  the 
stand-by credit facility of international organisations as well 
as by central bank and government measures. As a result of 
the  events,  similarly  to  other  parts  of  the  world,  more 
emphasis is laid on financial stability aspects in economic 
policy  decision-making  in  Hungary  as  well;  in  addition, 
there is an increasing need to review the knowledge which 
has been accumulated so far in connection with banking 
crises. Our article represents a contribution to this, using 
the  international  database  of  the  researchers  of  the 
international monetary Fund.
based on the experiences from the selected crisis episodes, 
a  wide  range  of  means  is  available  for  authorities  to 
manage the initial liquidity phase of a crisis. it is difficult, 
however,  to  draw  conclusions  regarding  the  success  of 
crisis  management.  estimates  for  frequently  used 
indicators,  such  as  fiscal  costs  or  the  magnitude  of  the 
output  loss  of  the  economy,  involve  a  high  level  of 
uncertainty.  moreover,  one  cannot  know  whether  the 
realised cost is a result of a series of successful measures 
avoiding a potentially even higher loss or the consequence 
of the incorrect handling of an originally smaller problem. 
it can, however, be established that decision-makers rarely 
resort to really drastic means.
the summary of the experiences of the countries examined 
can  be  that  extreme  monetary  policy  responses  are  not 
expedient. A substantial depreciation may become a self-
inducing  process,  and  may  cause  serious  damages  in  an 
economy with unhedged exchange rate positions. On the 
other hand, defending the exchange rate at any price is not 
possible  over  the  longer  term  by,  for  example,  foreign 
exchange  market  interventions  and  restraining  liquidity. 
instead,  it  is  worth  providing  liquidity  for  the  banking 
sector and, in addition, allowing some depreciation of the 
domestic currency.
in the case of the crises in the sample the lesson to be 
drawn from the changes in macroeconomic variables is 
that the real economy recovers from the crisis relatively 
quickly. nonetheless, the lasting increase in unemployment 
and the magnitude of the output loss indicate that the 
social  costs  may  appear  over  a  much  longer  period  of 
time. the global character of the current financial crisis 
and the narrowing export markets do not allow a rapid, 
export-driven  recovery,  which  was  typical  in  the  past, 
which may also lead to the protraction of the economic 
downturn.
Following  the  eruption  of  the  crisis,  the  banking  sector 
attempts to reduce its vulnerability, which is well reflected 
in the data in the analysis. if necessary, banks alter their 
respective financing structures and rely on external funds to 
a lesser extent. this may also result in a decline in loans to 
the  private  sector.  Considerable  currency  mismatch  may 
project  a  greater  extent  of  adjustment.  Overall,  the 
conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the sample is 
that the developments observed within the banking sector 
proved  to  be  permanent,  in  which  the  second  phase  of 
banking  crises,  a  possible  restructuring  of  the  banking 
sector may already have played a role.
REFEREnCES
allen, mark, rosenBerg, ChristoPh, keller, Christian, 
setser,  Brad  and  rouBini,  nouriel  (2002):  “A  balance 
Sheet Approach to Financial Crisis”, IMF Working Paper no. 
02/210.
CeCChetti,  stePhen  g.,  kohler,  marion  and  uPPer, 
Christian (2009): Financial Crises and Economic Activity, 
a study presented at the conference of the Federal Reserve 
bank of Kansas City, jackson Hole, August, uRl: http://























































Total sample Currency crisis
High public debt Currency mismatchmnb bulletin • june 2010 21
inteRnAtiOnAl eXPeRienCeS OF bAnKinG CRiSeS: mAnAGement tOOlS AnD...
englund,  Peter  and  Vesa  Vihriälä  (2003):  “Financial 
Crises in Developed economies: the Cases Of Sweden And 
Finland”,  Pellervo  Economic  Research  Institute  Working 
Papers no. 63.
laeVen,  luC  and  FaBian  ValenCia  (2008):  “Systemic 
banking Crises: A new Database”, IMF Working Paper no. 
08/224.
mák, istVán and Judit Páles (2009): “the role of the FX 
swap  market  in  the  Hungarian  financial  system”,  MNB 
Bulletin, may 2009, pp. 23–32.
meesook,  kanitta,  il  houng  lee,  olin  liu,  yougesh 
khatri, natalia tamirisa, miChael moore and mark h. 
krysl (2001): “malaysia: From Crisis to Recovery”, IMF 
Occasional Paper no. 207.
reinhart, Carmen and kenneth rogoFF (2008): “banking 
Crises:  An  equal  Opportunity  menace”,  NBER  Working 
Paper no. 14578.
AnnEX: GRouPInG oF CRISIS EPISoDES
Country Crisis date Currency crisis High public debt Currency mismatch
Argentina 1995   
Argentina 2001   
Bolivia 1984   NA
Brazil 1990   NA
Bulgaria 1996   NA
Chile 1981  NA 
Colombia 1998   NA
Croatia 1998   
Czech	Rep. 1996   NA
Ecuador 1998   
Estonia 1992  NA NA
Finland 1991   
Indonesia 1997   
Japan 1997   
Korea 1997   
Latvia 1995   NA
Lithuania 1995   NA
Malaysia 1997   
Mexico 1994   
Norway 1991   
Paraguay 1995   
Philippines 1997   
Russia 1998   
Sweden 1991   
Thailand 1997   
Turkey 2000   
Ukraine 1998   NA
Uruguay 2002   
Venezuela 1994  NA 
Vietnam 1997  NA NA
Table 1
  Grouping of crisis episodes
Note:  indicates that a country belongs to the given group; NA means we could not find information. 
Sources: Laeven–Valencia (2008) and own data collection.